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Gibson-Mull: State and Local Government

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
I.

REAPPORTIONMENT OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE

Black voters brought suit against various state officials and
the chairmen of the South Carolina Democratic and Republican
Parties to challenge South Carolina's 1972 senate reapportionment plan in Simkins v. Gressette.1 Alleging that the multimemher senatorial districts, with numbered seats and a majority runoff requirement in primary elections, diluted their voting
strength in violation of their rights under the first, thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution,2 these voters sought to have a three-judge federal district court convened to consider the constitutionality of the
plan.3 The district court judge granted defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint,4 and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.5
An action challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of a statewide legislative body must be heard by a district
court panel of three judges unless the judge to whom it is
presented determines that three judges are not required. 6 When
making this determination, the single judge is not permitted to
rule on the merits of the claim.7 In Simkins, the district court
applied the test for determining appropriateness of a threejudge panel articulated by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Maryland Citizens for a Representative GeneralAssembly v.
Governor of Maryland:8 the single judge need not request the
convening of a three-judge court if the complaint does not state

1. 631 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980).
2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a)(1976), "[a] district court of three judges shall be
convened... when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of... any statewide legislative body."
3. 631 F.2d at 289-90.
4. Simkins v. Gressette, 495 F. Supp. 1075, 1084 (D.S.C. 1980). Defendant's motion
was based on FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which provides for a motion to dismiss a claim for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
5. 631 F.2d at 296.

6. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2284(b)(1)(1976). See note 2 supra.

7. 28 U.S.C.

§

2284(b)(3)(1976).

8. 429 F.2d 606 (4th Cir. 1970).
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a substantial claim for relief, and, further, a claim for relief is
insubstantial if there is an "absence of federal jurisdiction, [a]
lack of substantive merit in the constitutional claim, or [if] injunctive relief is otherwise unavailable."" Using this test, the district court in Simkins found that traditional equitable considerations such as the potentially disruptive effect of an injunction
on the impending elections and the plaintiffs' "unreasonable delay" in commencing the suit1 0 dictated the denial of injunctive
relief. Nevertheless, the court went further to examine the complaint "to determine whether the factual allegations appear[ed]•
to be so compelling, if meritorious, that normal equitable principles governing the relief sought . . . should be totally disre-

12
garded"" and concluded that they were not.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's denial of a three-judge panel. When the disposition of a request for convening a three-judge panel to hear an
apportionment question is appealed, federal courts of appeals,
like district courts, must refrain from reviewing the merits of the
case and may determine only whether there is a substantial issue
susceptible of litigation.' 3 The United States Supreme Court, in
Goolsby v. Osser,"' stated that a claim is constitutionally insubstantial for the purpose of convening a three-judge panel when it
is "essentially fictitious," "obviously frivolous," and "obviously
without merit."'15 The Court further explained that "a claim is
insubstantial only if its unsoundness so clearly results from the
previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and
leave no room for the inference that the questions sought to be
raised can be the subject of controversy."'" The Fourth Circuit

9. Id. at 611.
10. 495 F. Supp. at 1081-82, 1083.
11. Id. at 1083. In Maryland Citizens, as in Simkins, a suit to enjoin elections based
on an allegedly unconstitutional apportionment plan was commenced only a short time
before the election process began. The court of appeals concluded that maintenance of a
suit at that time would disrupt the election process and that such a disruption was unjustified because the Maryland legislature had demonstrated its willingness to achieve a
constitutional apportionment. 429 F.2d at 610.
12. The court evaluated the allegations of the complaint against a background of
state and federal decisions. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 467 U.S. 55 (1980); McCollum
v. West, C.A. No. 71-1211 (D.S.C. April 7, 1972).
13. Edelberg v. Illinois Racing Bd., 540 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1976).
14. 409 U.S. 512 (1973).
15. Id. at 518.
16. Id.
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appears to have gone beyond a determination of substantiality
based on the allegations of the complaint by considering the
merits of the claims in Simkins.
In Simkins, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals relied
heavily on McCollum v. West, 17 an action before a three-judge
panel in which black South Carolina voters sought an injunction
against enforcement of the 1971 senate reapportionment plan. 8
The panel in McCollum found that the 1971 plan violated the
"one man, one vote" principle established by the United States
Supreme Court in 1964 in Reynolds v. Sims.19 After the decision
in McCollum, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted a
multimember district plan 0 that received the panel's approval.21
The panel subsequently denied a request by the plaintiffs in McCollum to modify the second plan but ruled that any party
might later challenge the plan upon presentation of additional
facts to prove its unconstitutionality.22
To meet the requirement of additional facts showing the
1971 plan's unconstitutionality, plaintiffs in Simkins sought to
establish a historical pattern of racial discrimination by showing
that, since the time of Reconstruction, no blacks have been
23
elected to the state senate-either before or after McCollum.
The Fourth Circuit, rejecting this evidence, reasoned that because multimember districts have been in existence only since
1966 and because no blacks had been elected under the previous
system of single member districts,24 there was no showing of discriminatory intent.2 5 The court further concluded that the fact
that no black senators have been elected since 1972 did not add
substantially to the claim.2 6 Consequently, citing decisions by
17. C.A. No. 71-1211 (D.S.C. April 11, 1972).

18. Brief of Appellant at 9-16. McCollum was heard with two companion cases:
Twiggs v. West, C.A. No. 71-1106 (D.S.C. 1971) and McLeod v. West, C.A. No. 71-1123

(D.S.C. 1971). Twiggs and McLeod challenged the 1971 plans only as failing to conform
with the one man, one vote principle. The cases were argued and decided together but
not formally consolidated. Simkins v. Gressette, 631 F.2d 289 n.4 (1980).
19. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20. 1972 S.C. Acts 2384, No. 1205 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1-60 (1976)).
21. McCollum v. West, No. 71-1211, order at 2-3 (D.S.C. June 9, 1972).
22. Id. at 2.

23. 631 F.2d at 293.
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Id. Similarly, the court summarily dismissed, as having nothing to do with race,

the claim that lack of access to financial resources reduced black voters' opportunities to
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the United States Supreme Court in Whitcomb v. Chavis27 and

City of Mobile v. Bolden,28 the court ruled thiat plaintiff's allegations, even if proven, were insufficient to support a claim for
relief.
In Whitcomb, the Supreme Court determined that disproportionate minority representation alone was not sufficient to
prove invidious discrimination. Although the Court gave little
guidance concerning a test for purposeful discrimination, it did
suggest the need for evidence that minority voters had less opportunity than other voters to participate in the political process. 29 Whitcomb made reference to White v. Register0 in which
the .Court, basing its decision upon a showing of a history of racial discrimination, 1 unanimously held the use of multimember
districts unconstitutional.82 In Bolden, a plurality of the Court,
ignoring the holding in White, stated that a showing that "the
group allegedly discriminated against has not elected representatives in proportion to its numbers" is not enough to prove invidious discrimination. 3 In Simkins, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that "Bolden and Whitcomb inescapably
render[ed] the [voters'] claim frivolous."'"
The conclusion of the Fourth Circuit in Simkins arguably is
overbroad. The United States Supreme Court has neither overruled White's precept that multimember districts are unconstitutional nor has it established a clear standard for proof of invidious discrimination. In any event, whether the complaint in
Simkins met the burden of proof within the meaning of Whitcomb and Bolden arguably is a question going to the merits of
the case, a question reserved for evaluation by a three-judge
panel rather than one upon which determination of insubstantiality may be predicated for the purpose of denying a voters' request to convene a three-judge panel.

participate in the political process.
27. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
28. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

403 U.S. at 149.
412 U.S. 755 (1973).
Id. at 769.
Id. at 765-67.
444 U.S. at 66.
631 F.2d at 295.
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LEGISLATORS IN ACTIONS

BROUGHT UNDER SECTION

1983

In Bruce v. Riddle,;5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that county legislators have absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. section 19836 for acts performed in a legislative capacity.37 Although the United States Supreme Court has
not ruled directly on the issue,s8 the Fourth Circuit found the
basis for its holding in past Supreme Court decisions.
In Bruce, plaintiff alleged that the Greenville County Council unconstitutionally rezoned his property in response to pressure by influential property owners. Before rezoning, plaintiff's
land had been designated for multifamily residences, and plaintiff had planned to build a 150-unit public housing complex on
the site.39 Claiming that the zoning amendment was an arbitrary, bad faith reclassification that substantially reduced the
value of his property, plaintiff brought suit under section 1983
against Greenville, South Carolina and the members of the
county council in their official and individual capacities. 40
The district court granted the council members' motion to
dismiss the cause of action against them individually on the
ground that they were entitled to absolute legislative immunity
from personal liability.41 On appeal, plaintiff argued that local

35. 631 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1980).
36. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides a federal cause of
action against:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in the action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. Plaintiff claimed that the County Council deprived him of property under color of
state law in violation of the fifth amendment and the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. He also alleged
violations of the due process and equal protection clauses in article I, § 3 of the South
Carolina Constitution and the taking of property without just compensation in violation
of article I, § 13. Record at 9.

37. 631 F.2d at 273.
38. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391, 404 n.26 (1979). See notes 58-61 and accompanying text infra.
39. 631 F.2d at 274.

40. Id. at 273.
41. Bruce v. Riddle, 464 F. Supp. 745, 748 (D.S.C. 1979).
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legislators were entitled only to qualified immunity42 and, alternatively, that private meetings between council members and interested parties, from which the rezoning decision allegedly resulted, took the council members outside the scope of legislative
immunity.43 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both
arguments, holding that county legislators have absolute immunity for acts performed in a legislative capacity" and that private meetings with interested parties do 45not remove council
members from the scope of this immunity.
Governmental immunity has its origins in the common law"
and is guaranteed to federal legislators by the speech and debate
clause of the United States Constitution. Quoting from Owen
v. City of Independence,'48 the Fourth Circuit presented a sum-

mary of the United States Supreme Court's development of governmental immunity.49 The Court first extended absolute immunity in section 1983 actions to state legislators in Tenney v.

Brandhove ° "to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success
...
.,"51 In Tenney, the Court examined the origins of the im-

42. 631 F.2d at 274. Good faith immunity constitutes a defense based on good faith
performance of official duties. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) for the qualification of "good faith" immunity for state legislators. For the application of a good faith
test for local legislators, see e.g. Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1971),
afl'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971); Smetanka v. Borough of Ambridge, 378 F. Supp.
1366 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958).
43. 631 F.2d at 274.
44. Id. at 278-79.
45. Id. The court explained that unless there was illegal conduct, it would not consider the motives of the city council members, whether good or bad.
46. For a discussion of common-law immunity for legislators, see Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides that "any Speech or Debate in either House shall'
not be questioned in any other place."
48, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
49. 631 F.2d at 275.
50. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
51. Id. at 373 (quoting 2 Works of James Wilson 38 (Andrews ed. 1896)(quoting
James Wilson, member of the Committee of Detail which was responsible for the speech
or debate clause)). Similarly, in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the Supreme Court
ruled that the common-law immunity traditionally available to judges also applied in §
1983 damage suits. In Pierson, a group of white and black clergymen sought damages
against a municipal police justice who convicted them of violating a Mississippi statute
that was later declared unconstitutional. The statute prohibited congregating in public
places. As in Tenney, the Court reasoned that the doctrine of judicial immunity was not
created "for the benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public,
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munity granted to federal legislators by the speech and debate
clause and concluded that, even though section 1983 is silent on
the issue of immunity, Congress did not intend to abrogate this
long-standing common-law privilege.2
The Supreme Court has been willing to extend immunity to
other public officials when the policy underlying judicial and legislative immunity is applicable. In Butz v. Economou,53 the
Court extended absolute immunity to an administrative judicial
hearing officer for the Department of Agriculture by comparing
the nature of his responsibilities with those of a judge." The
Court used this functional approach again in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 5 in which it
compared the function of government appointed members of the
planning agency to that of legislators.5 The Court in Lake
Country Estates concluded that, because the reasoning behind
the common-law immunity doctrine applies equally to federal,
state, and regional legislators, 57 planning agency members were
entitled to immunity from federal damage liability when "acting
in a capacity comparable to that of members of a state
legislature. ' ' 8
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bruce found this
historical common-law and functional approach persuasive. Because the South Carolina Supreme Court has declared that the
adoption of zoning ordinances is a legislative activity 9 and because the policy reasons for extending absolute immunity to legislators were found to apply equally to county council members,
the court of appeals found that the council members were entitled to protection from personal liability.60
The Fourth Circuit did not discuss the unwillingness of
many lower federal courts to extend absolute immunity to local

whose interest it is that judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences." 386 U.S. at 544 (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868)).
52. 341 U.S. at 376.
53. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
54. Id. at 511-12.
55. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
56. Id. at 406.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Conway v. City of Greenville, 254 S.C. 96, 173 S.E.2d 648 (1970).
60. 631 F.2d at 278-79.
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legislators. These courts have extended only qualified immunity
from liability under section 1983. A possible explanation may be
the Supreme Court's ruling in Monroe v. Pape6 l that municipalities are not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983 and
that, consequently, section 1983 afforded no cause of action
against a municipality.6 2 Under Monroe, a plaintiff injured by a
municipality through the action of its legislators had no cause of
action against the municipality or against the legislators if they
were accorded absolute immunity from liability. As a result,
many federal courts concluded that official immunity should be
used sparingly in order not to frustrate the intent of section
1983 to provide a federal remedy for the deprivation of federally
guaranteed rights and extend only a qualified immunity to local
legislators. 3 Recently, however, in Monell v. Dept. of Social
Services of the City of New York 64 and Owen v. City of Independence,6 5 the Supeme Court dispelled the notion that municipalities are absolutely immune from liability under section 1983.
Because these decisions allow the recovery of damages from
municipalities, the need for imposing personal liability on local
legislators no longer exists. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, was
reasonable in its perception that the next logical step in the progression of the Supreme Court's analysis from Tenney to Lake
Country Estates is the extension of absolute immunity to local
legislators.

III. HOME RULE AND THE "ONE-SHOT" DOCTRINE
Frustrated by four years of litigation in both federal"6 and
state courts, 67 the voters of Horry County finally achieved a
transition to home rule through Horry County v. Cooke.6 8 The

61. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
62. Id. at 187.
63. See, e.g., Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1971) and Jobson v.
Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966). The good faith defense available in those jurisdictions protects local legislators from civil liability if they reasonably rely on the legality of
their actions and have no improper purpose. See note 42 supra.
64. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
65. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
66. See Horry County v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 990 (D.S.C. 1978); McCray v.
Hucks, C.A. No. 76-2476 (D.S.C. 1976).
67. See Van Fore v. Cooke, 273 S.C. 136, 255 S.E.2d 339 (1979).
68. - S.C. -, 267 S.E.2d 82 (1980).
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county initiated suit in the South Carolina Supreme Court pur-

suant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act 69 claiming that
two acts"0 passed by the General Assembly in 1980 violated articles III and VIII of the South Carolina Constitution. One of the
acts at issue amended the Home Rule Act' to allow the General
Assembly to make subsequent enactments providing for the
transition to home rule government, 72 and the other established
a form of government for Horry County.7a Article III, section 34
of the constitution prohibits special legislation where general
laws can be made applicable,

4

and article VII 75 provides for the

management of local government by the respective counties and
69. S.C. CODE ANN.§§ 15-53-10 to -140 (1976).
70. 1980 S.C. Acts 1111, No. 300 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN.§ 4-9-10(c) (Supp.
1980)); 1980 S.C. Acts 2374, No. 609.
71. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4-9-10 to -1230 (Supp. 1980) is the enabling legislation commonly referred to as the Home Rule Act.
72. Act 300 amended § 4-9-10(c) by adding the following paragraph:
If the governing body of the county as initially or subsequently established
pursuant to a referendum or otherwise shall be declared to be illegal and not in
compliance with State and Federal law by a court of competent jurisdiction,
the General Assembly shall have the right to prescribe the form of government,
the method of election, and the number and terms of council members but
may submit to the qualified electors by referendum a question as to their
wishes with respect to any element thereof which question shall include as an
option the method of election in effect at the time of the referendum.
73. Act 609 provided for the establishment of the council-administrator form of government with eleven members elected from single member districts and a chairman
elected at-large from the county for a term of two years. The act also repealed the 1976
legislation originally enacted to establish home rule in the county.
74. - S.C. at , 267 S.E.2d at 85.
75. The relevant portions of the article are as follows:
§ 1. Powers of political subdivisions continued. The powers possessed by all
counties, cities, towns, and other political subdivisions at the effective date of
this Constitution shall continue until changed in a manner provided by law.
§ 7. Organization, powers, duties, etc., of counties; special laws prohibited. The
General Assembly shall provide by general law for the structure, organization,
powers, duties, functions, and the responsibilities of counties, including the
power to tax different areas at different rates of taxation related to the nature
and level of governmental services provided. Alternate forms of government,
not to exceed five, shall be established. No laws for a specific county shall be
enacted and no county shall be exempted from the general laws or laws applicable to the selected alternative form of government.
§ 17. Construction of Constitution and laws. The provisions of this Constitution and all laws concerning local government shall be liberally construed in
their favor. Powers, duties, and responsibilities granted local government subdivisions by this Constitution and by law shall include those fairly implied and
not prohibited by this Constitution.
S.C. CONST. art. VIII.
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prohibits the General Assembly from enacting special legislation
for any county.7 6 The court held that the two acts did not violate
the prohibition against special legislation and were constitutionally permissible under the "one-shot" doctrine of Duncan v.
York County."

In Duncan, the supreme court recognized that the General
Assembly has a duty to provide for the structure, organization,
power, duties, functions, and responsibilities of the counties.78
Plaintiff in Duncan brought suit against York County to attack
the constitutionality of two acts passed by the General Assembly
providing first for a referendum to select the form of government for York County and later for the establishment of that
government. Although the legislation applied to a specific
county, the court ruled that it was constitutionally permissible
as a "one-shot" proposition to bring about the orderly transition
to home rule.79 The court concluded that the Home Rule Act
complies with the constitutional mandate of article VIII to establish home rule government and that special legislation by the
General Assembly was necessary in order to provide for the
transition.8" The authority to enact legislation for a specific
county, however, was to be "temporary in nature and extend[ing] only to the point necessary to place Article VIII fully
into operation." 81
In August, 1975, the voters of Horry County selected a
council-administrator form of government and expressed their
preference for at-large elections. 82 Then in 1976, the General Assembly passed legislation to establish the chosen form of government and to provide for the county election." Under the "oneshot" doctrine of Duncan, this legislation was permissible in order to provide for the transition to home rule.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
267 S.C. 327, 228 S.E.2d 92 (1976).
Id. at 337, 228 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 345, 228 S.E.2d at 100.
Id. at 346, 228 S.E.2d at 101.
Id. at 345, 228 S.E.2d at 100.
S.C. at._, 267 S.E.2d at 83. The Home Rule Act permitted referendums to

be held before July 1, 1976 for the purpose of allowing county voters to select their
preference for one of the alternative forms of government. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4-9-10,-20

(1976).
83. 1976 S.C. Acts 2415, No. 845 provided for eight members and a chairman.
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The federal Voting Rights Act of 1965" requires submission
of any voting procedure for the approval of the United States
Attorney General to ensure compliance with the prohibition
against racial discrimination in voting.85 The Attorney General
must approve the plan before it can be enforced.86 The General
Assembly submitted the Horry County home rule plan to the
Attorney General, and elections were held.17 Ten days later and
within the statutory sixty-day period, the Attorney General interposed an objection and brought suit in federal court to enjoin
the seating of the county council members elected pursuant to
the plan.88 The district court determined that the Horry County
home rule plan was subject to the requirements of the Voting
Rights Act but permitted the incumbents to remain as a de facto
government pending the outcome of the suit.89
Prior to a determination on the merits of the plan contained
in the 1976 act, the General Assembly passed legislation in 1978
providing for the election of Horry County Council members
from single member districts and for the repeal of the 1976 plan.
The Justice Department made no objection to the 1978 plan, the
suit in district court was dismissed, and elections took place in
Horry County pursuant to the 1978 plan.90
Once again, however, the validity of the home rule plan was

84. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970). Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires that before
any change in a voting practice or procedure different from that in force in 1964 may be
enforced, the district court must determine that it does not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on the basis of race. Alternatively, the proposed change may
be submitted to the United States Attorney General for preclearance. If no objection to
the proposed change is interposed within sixty days after its submission, the plan may go
into effect without a judicial proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
86. See note 85 supra.
87. The General Assembly submitted Act 845, supra note 83, to the United States
Attorney General on March 16, 1976. The Attorney General requested additional information on May 17, 1976, but it was not received until September 13, 1976. Elections
were held in Horry County on November 2, 1976 and the Attorney General interposea
his objections on November 12, 1976, within the sixty-day period. Horry County v.
Cooke, 449 F. Supp. at 994.
88. McCray v. Hucks, C.A. No. 76-2476. The three judge court entered an order
allowing the members elected in the 1976 election to remain seated until the constitutionality of the 1976 legislation was determined. Order (March 22, 1977). Plaintiffs later
abandoned this action. See Horry County v. Cooke, 449 F. Supp. at 996.
89. 449 F. Supp. at 997. Horry County brought suit before a three judge court seeking to enjoin the 1978 elections under the yet untested 1976 legislative plan.
90. S.C. at
, 267 S.E.2d at 83.
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challenged. In Van Fore v. Cooke,91 the South Carolina Supreme

Court held that the 1978 legislation establishing the form of government for Horry County was legislation for a specific county
in violation of article VIII, section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution. 2 The court concluded that the Home Rule Act enables
the General Assembly to act by special legislation only to a limited extent in establishing the initial home rule government. 8
Although the court recognized the necessity for compliance with
the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, it would not allow
the legislature to accomplish that goal through the use of repeated special legislation.' Because the 1978 legislation was
found unconstitutional as special legislation, the results of the
1978 election were rendered void and the members of the 1976
de facto government resumed office.' 5
The decision in Van Fore created a serious dilemma for the
government of Horry County. Because the district court had not
had the opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the 1976
plan, Horry County was faced with the options of refiling suit in
federal court or devising a new plan and securing its approval by
the voters in the county. An expeditious solution appeared unavailable.' 6 Then, in 1980, the General Assembly amended the
Home Rule Act to permit special legislation in order to establish
a form of government should the county's governing body be declared illegal by a court.'7 Pursuant to this enabling legislation,
the legislature passed an act providing for the establishment of a
form of government and elections for Horry County identical to
the 1978 legislation which had been declared unconstitutional by
the supreme court in Van Fore.'
Horry County brought suit challenging the constitutionality
of the 1980 legislation in light of the prohibition against specific

91. 273 S.C. 136, 255 S.E.2d 339 (1979).

92. Id. at 139, 255 S.E.2d at 341.
93. Id. at 139, 255 S.E.2d at 340.
94. Id. at 139, 255 S.E.2d at 340.
95. Id. at 139, 255 S.E.2d at 341.
96. This problem was faced by other counties in which solution by referendum was
not possible. See United States v. Colleton County, C.A. No. 78-903 (D.S.C. 1978), where,
in two separate elections, the voters failed to adopt a plan that would comply with federal standards. See also United States v. Sumter County, C.A. No. 78-883 (D.S.C. 1978).
97. 1980 S.C. Acts 1111, No. 300 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-10(c) (Supp.
1980)).
98. 1980 S.C. Acts 2374, No. 609.
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legislation in article VIII, section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution." The supreme court, in rejecting the county's claim, recognized that while article VIII contemplates an orderly transition to home rule by means of specific legislation, such
legislation is limited to the establishment of the initial, fully operational government. 10 0 The court concluded, however, that the
amendment to the Home Rule Act is a general law applicable to
all counties.10 1 Furthermore, the court interpreted the amendment to apply only during transition to the initial county government. 10 2 Because it is the general law that permits the legislature to establish the initial government for the county, the court
concluded that the legislation merely amended the general law
to encompasss those situations in which more than one attempt
is necessary to effectuate the transition.10 3 Providing a general
law for subsequent attempts to establish the initial government
is consistent with the "one-shot" doctrine of Duncan that contemplates legislation only to the point necessary to place home
rule fully into operation.1 0 '
The constitutionality of the 1980 legislation also was attacked on the ground that it violated article III, section 34 of the
South Carolina Constitution, which prohibits special laws where
general laws can be made applicable.1 05 Even though legislation
may be expressed in general terms, it violates the constitutional
provision if it is special in its operation. 10 6 The issue must be
decided not by the letter but by the spirit and practical operation of the act.1 0 7 The fact that a law affects only one county,

99.

-

S.C. at

100. Id. at
101. Id. at
102. Id. at

-,
-,

103. Id. at
104. Id. at

,
-,

-,

267 S.E.2d at 83-84.

267 S.E.2d at 83-84.
267 S.E.2d at 83-84.
267 S.E.2d at 83-84.

-,

267 S.E.2d at 85.
267 S.E.2d at 85.

105. Article VIII, § 34 provides, inter alia:
The General Assembly of this State shall not enact local or special laws concerning any of the following subjects or for any of the following purposes, to
wit:
IX. In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no special
law shall be enacted.
'S.C.

.

..

CONsT. art. III, § 34.
106. Elliott v. Sligh, 233 S.C. 161, 165, 103 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1958).
107. Id. at 165, 103 S.E.2d at 926.
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however, does not render it special legislation.1 08 If the legislative language is unambiguous and general in its application, the
court will not inquire into the legislative intent. 10 9 Here, the
court concluded that the 1980 legislation created a general
classification applicable to all counties, and it made no further
inquiry into the legislative history or intent. 110
Having found the amendment to the Home Rule Act constitutional, the court examined the act that established the form of
government for Horry County. Although the 1980 act was identical to the 1978 legislation struck down in Van Fore,"' the court
upheld its constitutionality in light of the amendment to the
Home Rule Act. The statute permitted specific legislation "[i]f
the governing body of the county as initially or subsequently established" were declared illegal by a court. 1 2 This amendment
brought Horry County within the provision of the statute and
made it permissible for the General Assembly to pass specific
legislation establishing the County's form of government. In
Cooke, the court made a constitutionally sound decision to uphold a statute that recognizes the practical difficulties of implementing a home rule government in compliance with both federal and state constitutional requirements while limiting the
General Assembly's ability to interfere with the affairs of local
government.
POSTCITATION DISCOVERY RULES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARINGS

IV.

Pursuant to section 41-15-310 of the South Carolina
Code,113 the South Carolina Commissioner of Labor promul-

108. Timmons v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 401, 175 S.E.2d 805, 817
(1970).
109. Id. at 401, 175 S.E.2d at 817.
110.

-

S.C. at

-,

267 S.E.2d at 85.

111. Compare Act 609, supra note 98, with 1978 S.C. Acts 2447, Nos. 776-77. These
acts provided alternative plans for the election of eleven council members from single
member districts and for a chairman elected at-large. They also established eleven election districts and repealed the 1976 legislation.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-10(c) (Supp. 1980).
113. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-15-130 (1976) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The Commissioner of Labor shall promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to establish a procedure for administrative review before the
Commissioner or his authorized representative or representative for any employer or employee or employee's representative affected or aggrieved by (1)
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gated rules 114 authorizing the use of certain discovery procedures
by the Department of Labor after issuance of citations for the
violation of health and safety regulations. 11 5 In Milliken v.
South Carolina Department of Labor,"6 the South Carolina
Supreme Court invalidated those rules as violative of due
process.' 17
In 1970, the United States Congress enacted an occupational safety and health program (administered by OSHA) to
ensure safe and healthful working conditions in businesses affecting interstate commerce." 8 The legislation authorized the
Secretary of Labor of the United States to carry out the purposes and policy of the program by setting mandatory occupational safety and health standards, and it established an effective enforcement program." 9 In addition, the legislation
encouraged states to assume responsibility for the administration and enforcement of federal standards by submitting to the
Secretary of Labor suitable plans setting forth standards and
means to enforce those standards.'20 In 1971, the South Carolina
General Assembly enacted such a plan,' 2 ' and it was approved
and implemented in 1973.2 Shortly thereafter, however, the
South Carolina Labor Council (AFL-CIO) sought to enjoin administration of the plan, charging that it failed to meet the required standards."2$ To assure the plan's continuation, the General Assembly amended the initial legislation,"' and the union
withdrew its suit."25

One of the amendments to the plan both broadened review
of the State Commissioner of Labor's actions by providing agany act of the Commissioner, (2) any citation issued by the Commission, (3)
any penalty assessed by the Commissioner, or (4) any period of abatement set
by the Commissioner.
114. See notes 128-31 and accompanying text infra.
115. Id.
116. - S.C. -, 269 S.E.2d 763 (1980).
117. Id. at 269 S.E.2d 764.
118. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
119. Id. §§ 651, 659.
120. Id. § 667(b), (c).
121. 1971 S.C. Acts 505, No. 379.
122. S.C. Dssr. OF LABOR ANN. REP., No. 38, at 15 (1973).
123. Id.
124. 1973 S.C. Acts 370, Nos. 305-12.
125. S.C. DEPr. oF LABOR ANN. RP,., No. 38, at 15.
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grieved employers the right to seek an administrative hearing126

and expanded the Commissioner's authority "to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to establish a
procedure for administrative review. ' 11 Pursuant to his expanded authority, the Commissioner promulgated two rules providing for postcitation discovery. The first was South Carolina
Labor Regulation 71-4.10(A)(2),"2 8 which made the Rules of
Practice for the Circuit Courts of South Carolina applicable to
Department of Labor Proceedings and which the Commissioner
interpreted to permit repeated inspections of premises pursuant
to Circuit Court Rule 88.129 The second was South Carolina Labor Regulation 71-4.10(Y),130 which provided for service of interrogatories on any party to a Department of Labor proceeding
after notice of protest to a Department citation.131
Pursuant to the South Carolina Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 13 2 the South Carolina Department of Labor in-

spected four of Milliken's textile mills and, following the inspections, cited the mills for exposing employees to excessive levels
of cotton dust in violation of OSHA standards. Miliken con-

126.

-

S.C. at

-,

269 S.E.2d at 764.

127. 1973 S.C. Acts 370, No. 310 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-50-310 (1976)).
Before this amendment, an aggrieved employer could appeal only to the circuit court.
There was no express provision for administrative hearings until the amendment was
passed.
128. S.C. LABOR REG. 71-4.10(A)(2)(Supp. 1979) provides, in pertinent part, that
"[e]xcept as specifically set forth to the contrary in this section (4.10), procedures shall
be in accordance with the Code of Laws of South Carolina and the Rules of Practice for
the Circuit Courts of South Carolina, insofar as such Rules can be made applicable to
proceedings hereunder."
129. S.C. CiR. CT. R. 88 (1976). The rule provides, inter alia, as follows:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon written notice of ten days to all other parties, the Court in which an action is pending
may... (2) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting . . .the
property or any designated object or operation thereon within the scope of the
examination permitted by the rule relating to depositions.
130. S.C. LABOR REG. 71-4.10(Y)(Supp. 1979).

131. Id. § (1) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Any party may serve upon any other party "written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency, by any officer or
agent who shall furnish such information as is available to the party.
132. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-15-260 (1976) permits the Commissioner or any agency
official to inspect "all places. . . where employment comes under the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner for compliance" with OSHA standards.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss1/11

16

Gibson-Mull:
StateLOCAL
and Local
Government
STATE AND
GOVERNMENT

1981]

tested the citations and requested a review hearing before the
Commissioner. Before the hearing, the Department served interrogatories on the mills and sought entry for the purpose of further investigation."3 Milliken refused to answer the interrogatories or permit reentry. The Department's administrative hearing
officer ordered Milliken to comply with the request, and the
Commissioner affirmed the order. On appeal, the circuit court
reversed the order and held that the Commissioner lacked statutory authority to promulgate postcitation discovery rules for its
administrative review hearings. 3'
The Department appealed to the South Carolina Supreme
Court and argued that the postcitation discovery procedures
were necessary to make the state plan as effective as the federal
program and that the federal regulatory agency employs similar
devices in connection with its administrative hearings.13 5 The
court rejected these arguments and affirmed the circuit court's
determination,3 6 focusing on the nature of a citation. Section
41-15-280 of the South Carolina Code authorizes the Commissioner or his agent to issue a citation if, upon inspection or investigation, he ascertains that an employer has violated an
OSHA standard. The language in this provision suggests that
such action by the Commissioner constitutes a final determination or judgment: once a citation issues, the employer has the
17
right to an administrative hearing to review this judgment.

3

The court concluded that this hearing is appellate in nature, intended to be based only on information discovered by the investigating officer responsible for issuing the citation, and that additional investigation through postcitation discovery procedures
would violate due process. 3 8 The court reinforced its decision by
referring to the South Carolina Administrative Procedure Act,' s3
which provides for judicial review of final agency actions:
"[T]hat Act clearly contemplates a straight-line agency process

133. - S.C. at -, 269 S.E.2d at 763. Numerous questions were posed requesting
information concerning manufacturing process stages such as fiber composition, methods
of ventilation, cotton dust sampling, and other technical data. See Record at 3-23.
134. Record at 24-48, 67.
135. Brief of Appellant at 16.
136.

-

137. S.C.
138.

-

139. S.C.

S.C. at

-,

CODE ANN.

S.C. at

-,

CODE ANN.

269 S.E.2d at 763.

§ 41-15-310 (1976).
269 S.E.2d at 764.

§ 1-23-10 to -400 (Supp. 1980).
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beginning with fact-finding and ending with judicial review; it
does not contemplate an agency's continuous re-initiation of in'
vestigation throughout the process. "140
To suggest that the Administrative Procedure Act is appellate in nature and provides only for an agency's review of its
factfinding process is erroneous. The Act provides the opportunity for a hearing for all parties in contested cases.' 4' These
hearings encompass rate-making, price-fixing, and licensing decisions. 142 The nature of contested cases indicates that the agency
action is a preliminary decision subject to additional fact-finding
procedures before a review hearing. Only after the review hearing are the rights of the parties finally determined. 4 Furthermore, nothing in the Act suggests that agency hearings should
be limited to appellate review. Its purpose is not to deprive either the agency or litigants of previously established rights and
procedures but to provide procedures that augment expeditious
and fair resolution of contested agency actions. 44
Denominating the Department's administrative hearing an
appellate proceeding is unlikely to hinder seriously the Labor
Commission's enforcement effectiveness because the Comnssioner's investigatory powers can be used to issue any necessary
rule or regulation to enhance fact-finding procedures before the
issuance of a citation. 14 5 Nevertheless, the ruling in Milliken
that administrative proceedings are appellate in nature should
be limited to administrative hearings concerning occupational
safety and health where a conclusion that issuance of citations
constitutes final agency action is justified by statutory language.
Extending Milliken to all administrative hearings held pursuant
to the Administrative Procedures Act would be a misinterpretation of the Act.
Pamela Gibson-Mull

140. S.C. at -, 269 S.E.2d at 764.
141. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-320 (Supp. 1980).
142. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(2)(Supp. 1980)(definition of contested cases).
143. Id.

144. For a discussion of administrative adjudications under the Act, see Administrative Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 30 S.C.L. REV. 1, 12-22 (1979).
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-15-210 (1976). The statute authorizes the Commissioner to
promulgate rules and regulations for the purpose of attaining the highest degree of
health and safety protection for employees. Additionally, §§ 41-15-260, -270 grant extensive investigatory power to the Commissioner before the issuance of a citation.
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